Contacts
Nuclear Energy and Global Security Technologies Center Director
Sid Gutierrez
(smgutie@sandia.gov)
(505)844-6968
Geoscience Research and Applications Group Manager
John Merson
(jamerso@sandia.gov)
(505)844-2756
At the September 1998 General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), then U.S. Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson outlined six legacies from the first five decades of the nuclear century and the steps that must be taken to meet the future challenges they present.(1) Among these six legacy issues are two that make clear the urgent need to provide for safe, secure, and transparent disposition of fissile materials resulting from both the weapons and civilian nuclear power fuel cycles.
These two legacy issues are: 1) "the vast amounts of fissile material from nuclear weapons reductions that need to be controlled" and 2) "the challenge of managing the fuel cycle's back end and assuring the safe use of nuclear power." All nuclear weapons and nuclear energy cycles eventually require long-term management of fissile materials in some form of repository, whether for permanent geologic disposal or for long-term storage.
With the growth of nuclear energy in Asia and other developing nations, the amount of material at the back end of nuclear fuel cycles is growing at an ever-increasing rate. The result of these developments is a growing quantity of back-end materials that is rapidly surpassing the development of back-end disposition options. Assuring the "grave" in cradle-to-grave management of nuclear materials is a key challenge faced by many nations and is characterized by strong international interest and concern.
Long-term disposition of fissile materials in a safe, secure, and transparent manner will directly contribute to resolving the nuclear legacy in three important areas:
Arms Control and Nonproliferation – Diversion of materials at the back end of the nuclear materials/weapons cycle is a long-term risk that impacts national security. Creation of viable back-end management options is an important component for implementation of some arms reduction processes.
Political Viability of the Next Generation of Nuclear Energy – Successful management of the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle has a major impact at the front end of the next generation of nuclear energy . Political resistance to nuclear energy around the globe is strongly influenced by the lack of safe, secure, and transparent nuclear materials final disposition.
International Environmental Security – A well-designed and managed back end of the nuclear materials cycle will significantly reduce the risk of radionuclide releases that may result in transnational impacts on health, safety, and the environment, with associated negative impacts on transnational relationships.
Given the compelling security, economic, and policy issues associated with long-term disposition of nuclear materials, there is an urgent need for technical, financial, and political investment to facilitate long-term disposition of these materials. Successful implementation of fissile materials repositories in national and international settings requires both proven repository technologies and political acceptance at local, national and international levels.
An important tool in developing political acceptance to build trust, acceptance, and confidence in the implementation of repository systems through a range of transparency processed. Transparency is defined as a cooperative process of providing information to outside parties so that these parties can independently assess the safety, security, and legitimate utilization of repositories for nuclear materials disposition. A wide range of local, national, and in some cases international concerns impacts the viability of these systems. Repository development programs in many parts of the world are learning the importance of local acceptance of proposed disposition facilities.
Sandia National Laboratories is working with a number of organizations to develop concepts, technologies, and international dialogue on transparent disposition of nuclear materials at the back end of the nuclear fuel/weapons cycle. A number of these developments were displayed, presented, and discussed at the DOE International Conference on Geologic Repositories in Denver, Colorado, October 31 to November 3, 1999.
Representatives of the Department of Energy, the national laboratories, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), and others gathered at a February 1999 workshop to initiate the development of broad-based concepts and strategies for transparency monitoring of nuclear materials at the back end of the fuel/weapons cycle, including both geologic disposal and monitored retrievable storage. The workshop focused on two key questions: "Why should we monitor?" and "What should we monitor?" The workshop is summarized in SAND99-2219 (168k pdf), "Concepts and Strategies for Transparency Monitoring of Nuclear Materials at the Back End of the Fuel Weapons Cycle."